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This survey examines the impact of the 
collapse of global commodity prices on the 
PNG economy. It also compares the pattern 
of government expenditure during the 1990s 
commodity boom with its expenditure during 
the recent boom. Ongoing reforms in the 
telecommunications, international airline services 
and intergovernmental financing arrangements 
are also analysed. As well, it presses the case for 
further microeconomic reforms to promote a 
more inviting investment environment.
2008 was a turbulent year for Papua New 
Guinea (PNG). During the first two quarters 
economic growth remained strong as the 
country continued to benefit from the 
mineral price boom dating back to 2002. 
High commodity prices underpinned 
a significant expansion in other sectors 
of the economy such as manufacturing, 
construction and agriculture. Towards the 
middle of the year, however, poor monetary 
responses to rapid growth in the money 
supply, coupled with the strong external 
sector, meant that inflationary pressures 
began to increase—rising from 1.6 per 
cent in September 2007 to 13.5 per cent a 
year later. The inflation began to erode the 
benefits of solid economic growth.
September 2008 saw the onset of the 
global financial crisis. Barring some jitters 
on the stock exchange, the PNG economy 
weathered the immediate effects of the crisis 
relatively unscathed. In large part this was 
because of the healthy foreign exchange 
reserves and domestic bank liquidity built 
up over previous years, which gave the 
financial sector flexibility to cope. However, 
one of the flow-on effects of the crisis has 
been the large downturn in the prices of 
most of Papua New Guinea’s key primary 
commodity exports, which have been 
driving revenue and output growth.
The sharp decline in export prices 
had an immediate impact on the PNG 
Government’s fiscal position, with the 2009 
Budget predicting a 25 per cent decline 
in domestic tax revenues (Figure 1 shows 
the expected decline in commodity prices 
factored into the Budget). In last year’s 
economic survey of Papua New Guinea, 
Warner and Omuru (2008) warned that 
Papua New Guinea would one day face 
this situation, highlighting the need for 
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commodity boom revenues to be invested 
in productivity-enhancing sectors that can 
generate long-term economic benefits; so 
that the economy can better withstand 
future economic downturns. The global 
financial crisis appears to have brought a 
halt to the economic boom, raising questions 
such as: how will Papua New Guinea fare 
during this period of global instability? 
Has it made, or is it making, the needed 
investments in human and physical capital 
to withstand a sustained global economic 
downturn? Or will this commodity boom 
in Papua New Guinea follow the path of 
previous booms and be followed by an 
economic bust?
Recent economic developments
Papua New Guinea has benefited greatly 
in recent years from the upswing in global 
primary commodity prices for its export cash 
crops (coffee, cocoa and palm oil), timber, 
minerals (copper and gold) and petroleum. 
There is no doubt that the adverse impact of 
the global financial crisis on the consumers 
of these commodities is having an adverse 
impact on the PNG economy. Moreover, it is 
likely that this adverse impact will continue 
for a considerable period. So far, however, the 
outcome for Papua New Guinea’s exports is 
not all gloom. Cocoa, coffee and tea prices 
have held up fairly well (Table 1). Importantly 
for Papua New Guinea, the gold price remains 
at a high level. At the time of writing, the gold 
price had increased over the January 2009 
level to around US$1,000/troy ounce. Given 
the continuing instability in global financial 
markets, gold is likely to remain in strong 
demand and Papua New Guinea could be a 
beneficiary of this unfortunate situation.
Table 1 illustrates the severity of the 
impact of the global financial crisis and 
Table 1 Recent international primary commodity prices, 2006–2009 (US$)
2006 2007 2008 2009 (Jan)
Cocoa (c/kg) 159.2 195.2 257.7 262.4
Coffee (c/kg) (Arabicia) 252.2 272.4 308.2 282.9
Tea (c/kg) (Average of 3 auctions) 187.2 203.6 242.0 219.2
Palm oil (US$ per metric tonne) 478 780 949 534
Logs Malaysian (US$ per cubic metre) 239.4 268.0 292.3 329.7
Sawnwood Malaysian (US$ per cubic metre) 749.0 806.3 889.1 818.4
Copper (US$ per metric tonne) 6,722 7,118 6,956 3,221
Gold (US$ per troy ounce) 604 697 872 859
Crude oil (US$ per barrel, average spot price) 64.29 71.12 96.99 43.86
Source: World Bank, 2009a. Commodity Pink Sheet, February, World Bank, Washington, DC.
3Economic survey
Pacific Economic BullEtin
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 24 number 1 2009 © the australian national university
fuels. However, agricultural oils prices 
have declined along with the decline in 
the price of crude oil. As a result, the palm 
oil price is back to a level above the 2006 
average. For those interested in developing 
palm oil projects in Papua New Guinea and 
elsewhere in the Pacific, the 2006 price is 
more likely to be an indicator of long-term 
prices for palm oil than the price levels in 
2007 and 2008.
The 2009 National Budget estimated a 
real GDP growth rate of 7.3 per cent for 2008, 
the highest rate of growth since 1993 and 
well above the country’s high population 
growth rate. This good performance builds 
on the 6.5 per cent real GDP growth in 2007. 
resulting recession on the demand for raw 
materials. The copper price and the crude 
oil price have more than halved from their 
2008 averages (see also Figure 1). In January 
2009, Malaysian log prices were above their 
average 2008 prices, while sawn wood had 
declined somewhat. However, it has to 
be expected that demand for timber will 
decline as the result of poor global economic 
growth. Beverage prices are likely to be 
similarly affected.
The huge decline in the price for palm 
oil is interesting. The sharp run-up in the 
price in 2007 and 2008 resulted from strong 
international demand for agricultural oils, 
led by the growing global interest in bio-
Figure 1  Commodity Price Index, 2002–2012 (2002=100)
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Non-mining and non-oil GDP is estimated 
to have grown by around 7.9 per cent 
in 2008; the result of the flow-on effects 
from the boom in minerals and petroleum 
prices, as well as the positive impact of the 
increase in the prices of the soft commodity 
exports. The economic expansion has been 
supported by the continuing growth in both 
government spending and private sector 
credit.
Other sectors of the PNG economy also 
continued to perform strongly in 2008. The 
agriculture sector, which made up 35 per 
cent of Papua New Guinea’s total output in 
2007, grew by 3.8 per cent in that year and its 
growth is expected to have accelerated to 5.0 
per cent in 2008. The industrial sector, which 
comprises manufacturing and construction, 
accounted for 33.8 per cent of GDP in 2007, 
and is estimated to have increased by 7.6 
per cent in 2007 and by 7.8 per cent in 2008. 
Likewise, the output of the services sectors 
increased by 9.4 per cent in 2007 and is 
estimated to have grown by 9.6 per cent 
in 2008.
Within the services  sector,  the 
government has given high priority to 
the rehabilitation and development of 
infrastructure, drawing on the surge in its 
mineral revenues. This contributed to the 
strong growth in the transportation and 
communication sector, which grew by a 
stunning 35 per cent in 2007 and which 
is projected to grow by a further 27.4 per 
cent in 2008. Telecommunications and air 
transport have also contributed to these 
high growth rates and are discussed in more 
detail below.  The building and construction 
sector also continued its recent high growth 
rates, most notably from an increase in 
mining development. The 2006 growth 
rate of this sector was 12 per cent. It rose 
to 14 per cent in 2007 and it is estimated 
to increase by around 13 per cent in 2008. 
The telecommunications and air transport 
sectors have also contributed to these high 
growth rates and are discussed in more 
detail below.
Household incomes have increased, 
particularly as the result of the increase 
in world prices of tree crops. The strength 
of domestic demand was evident in the 
increase in lending to the private sector—
which rose by 35.3 per cent as of June 
2008—and in the increase in formal private 
sector employment by 8.4 per cent over 
the period March 2007 to March 2008. The 
government acted against the recent high 
petroleum prices, which, as with the recent 
high food prices, have had a negative 
impact on households, especially in squatter 
settlements in the urban areas but also in 
rural households. While it has reduced 
taxes on petroleum, the Government has 
not succumbed to pressure to implement 
widely favoured fuel subsidies, because 
of fears of a possible adverse impact on its 
fiscal position.
On any measure, Papua New Guinea’s 
inflation rate in 2007 of just less than one 
per cent was an excellent performance. 
Food prices increased by only 1.6 per cent, 
while non-food prices fell by 1.3 per cent. In 
addition to global factors, continued fiscal 
surpluses combined with moderate public 
sector wage outcomes contributed to this 
outcome. However, inflationary pressures 
began rising in the first half of 2008. The 
main reasons behind the change were the 
fast growth in the money supply, strong 
private sector growth, improved terms of 
trade, and growing fiscal stimulus. The 2009 
Budget projected inflation to be 10.6 per 
cent in 2008—well above the 5.2 per cent 
target of the 2008 Budget—as the result of 
higher imported inflation from the country’s 
main trading partners, further increases 
in international food and oil prices, and 
depreciation of the kina against the major 
trading partners’ currencies. 
Whilst driven by imported sources, 
poor monetary responses from the central 
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bank also encouraged inflation. Low interest 
rates were maintained throughout the 
period of rapid expansion in private sector 
credit before it was decided to lift the Kina 
Facility Rate by one per cent when the global 
financial crisis began.
Merchandise exports were estimated 
to be US$4.9 billion in 2007—an increase 
of 16.4 per cent over 2006—but to decline 
to US$4.6 billion in 2008. Merchandise 
imports were estimated to be US$2.7 billion 
in 2007 and declining to US$2.4 billion in 
2008. Services imports were also expected 
to fall in 2008—from US$1.9 billion in 2007 
to US$1.5 billion.
According to the Bank of Papua New 
Guinea, Australia was the main recipient 
of Papua New Guinea’s exports in 2007, 
with 40.4 per cent of the total. Other major 
destinations were Japan (16.9 per cent), 
Germany (8.3 per cent), and the Philippines 
(7.7 per cent). In the first quarter of 2008, 
exports to China picked up, lifting its share 
from 3.4 per cent in 2007 to 8.3 per cent. 
China’s demand for raw materials, combined 
with high commodity prices, fuelled this 
rise. As a result of China’s raw materials 
risk management strategy of diversifying its 
sources, it has also become more interested 
in investing in mining projects in Papua 
New Guinea. Australia is also the main 
source of imports for Papua New Guinea. 
In 2007, imports from Australia contributed 
42.3 per cent of Papua New Guinea’s total 
imports. Other major partners were the US 
(19.5 per cent), Singapore (14.6 per cent) and 
Japan (4.2 per cent).
The current account surplus in 2007 
was a modest US$262 million because of 
continuing substantial net outflows in 
services trade and net factor income. The 
surplus was projected to decline to US$209 
million in 2008. However, the end of the 
commodity boom has led to a re-emergence 
of balance of payments outflows in the 
final quarter of 2008. The trade balance and 
the current account are expected to move 
into deficit from 2009 onwards, resulting 
in a prolonged capital account deficit (see 
Figure 2).
Foreign reserves as at the end of 2007 
were US$2.1 billion, the equivalent of 
4.7 months of goods and services import 
coverage. It was projected that reserves 
would reach US$2.45 billion by the end of 
2008 (equivalent to 5.2 months of imports).
Expected developments
The 2009 Budget expected the PNG economy 
to remain in a reasonably strong position 
over the next two years. Real GDP growth 
of 6.0 per cent was projected for 2009 
and 5.2 per cent in 2010. The agricultural 
sector is expected to slow a little—to 4.0 
per cent in both years—while real GDP in 
the manufacturing sector is expected to 
decline from 6 per cent in 2008 to 5 per cent 
in 2009.
The services sector is expected to take a 
sharp downturn from the over 9.0 per cent 
growth rates of the past two years to 5.5 
per cent in 2009 and 3.1 per cent in 2010. 
The expected downturn is largely based 
on an assumption by the government that 
the recent robust growth in the ‘transport, 
storage and communication’ sector will not 
be maintained; which amongst other factors 
reflects an expected moderation of the recent 
rapid growth of the mobile phone sector (see 
further below).
The strong and broadly based economic 
growth has led to record increases in 
formal sector employment levels. In 2007 
and 2008 non-mineral sector employment 
grew by 10.2 per cent and 8.3 per cent, 
respectively, with growth spread across the 
retail, agriculture, forestry and fisheries, 
manufacturing, and construction industries. 
Mineral sector employment also grew 
strongly, increasing in the year to June 
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quarter 2008 by 12.6 per cent. However, 
this employment growth is likely to 
moderate in 2009 due to the slowdown 
in economic activity and implementation 
of the recent Minimum Wages Board final 
determination, which is awaiting approval 
from the National Executive Council 
(NEC). This determination recommends an 
immediate 35 per cent increase in minimum 
wages (from K0.84 per hour to K1.14 per 
hour), followed by a further 100 per cent 
increase to K2.29 per hour 40 weeks after 
its implementation.
Inflation of 6.1 per cent was projected 
for 2009 and 6.5 per cent for 2010 in the 
2009 Budget. However, circumstances 
changed markedly towards the end of 2008 
as a consequence of the global financial 
crisis, with the Australian dollar declining 
sharply against the US dollar and the kina 
appreciating against the US dollar. As a 
result, the relatively high inflation expected 
in 2009 may well not be realised because the 
appreciation of the kina will keep imported 
inflation down and dampen domestic 
economic growth.
Unlike in  previous booms,  the 
Government has large unspent windfall 
revenues held in various trusts, which it 
will be able to use to maintain expenditure 
at commodity boom levels for a number of 
years. Indeed, this is expected to be the case 
in 2009 with the Budget foreshadowing a 
K600 million drawdown from a trust fund 
that was holding revenues to buy equity 
in the now defunct gas pipeline project. 
However, perhaps the most important 
difference between this and past cycles is 
Figure 2 Balance of payments, 2002–2013 (kina million)
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the prospect of the Exxon-Mobile gas project. 
In the event that the gas project comes on-
stream, it will fundamentally change the 
nature and structure of the PNG economy.
Despite this, the PNG economy faces a 
number of risks over the medium term. Gas 
project revenues will not come on-stream 
for many years, highlighting the need for 
continued fiscal discipline. The benefits of 
growth also continue to be concentrated in 
the hands of a few; and all wage earners are 
feeling the pinch of high inflation. Further 
microeconomic reform is also needed if 
Papua New Guinea is to set itself on a long-
term, sustainable growth path.
Management of the windfall: 
comparing the mining booms of 
the 1990s and the 2000s
The mining boom of the early 1990s ended 
with a fiscal crisis and a forced floating of 
the currency. The mining boom experienced 
over the past several years has recently ended 
and the economy appears to be in reasonably 
good shape. It is of interest, therefore, to 
compare the government’s management 
during the two mining boom periods.
Government expenditure during the 
two boom periods is shown in Table 2, 
broken down into major areas: salaries 
and benefits, goods and services (the main 
category is utilities), current transfers (the 
main category is grants and transfers to 
public authorities), international payments 
and borrowings (interest payments on 
domestic and overseas public debt) and 
debt repayments (repayment of principal of 
domestic and foreign public debt).
The main growth in expenditure during 
the 1991 to 1994 period took place in salaries 
and benefits and in current transfers (Table 
2). In 1995, budgeted expenditure on salaries 
and benefits was cut back sharply to the 
1991 level in current kina terms. Current 
transfers were also reduced but not by 
as much. Meanwhile, domestic public 
borrowings tripled in current terms over 
the 1991–95 period (with Treasury Bills the 
main component) and external borrowings 
increased by 70 per cent. There was little 
attempt to pay down the public debt (see 
International Payments and Borrowings in 
Table 2 and Table 3), so that over the 1991–95 
period aggregate public debt rose from 43.5 
per cent of GDP to 53.7 per cent (Table 3).
Research has shown that developing 
countries’ tend to respond to windfall 
revenues, such as from commodity booms, 
mainly by increasing consumption (recurrent) 
spending, rather than saving or investing 
in replacement capital (see, for example, 
Duncan 1995). This certainly appears to 
have been the case in Papua New Guinea 
in the 1990s mining boom. Government 
salaries and benefits and current transfers 
were increased to unsustainable levels, 
even to the point that the government had 
to borrow to such an extent that interest 
payments more than doubled between 
1994 and 1995. Some of the other more 
extravagant recurrent expenditures were the 
tax incentives introduced in the 1993 Budget 
aimed at attracting private investment 
(expected to cost K100 million over 1993 
and 1994) and the increase in the Electoral 
Development Fund (the so-called ‘slush 
fund’) to K300,000 in 1994 (from K100,000 
in 1993) and to K500,000 in 1995. The 
introduction of free education in 1993 and 
1994 was at least an effort to enhance human 
capital. However, government expenditure 
on physical investment did not increase at 
all during this period.
The following quote from the 1993 
Budget reflects the attitude of the government 
at the time,
The 1993 Budget heralds in something 
of a new era in fiscal policy in that 
the revenue and balance of payments 
constraints have to some extent 
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been relaxed, at least in the short 
term. The relaxation occurs as a 
result of receipt from 1993 of very 
rapidly improving revenues from 
mining and especially petroleum.  
Recognition of the new situation has 
led the government to believe that 
a somewhat more aggressive fiscal 
policy is now appropriate (Papua 
New Guinea 1993).
The government’s handling of the 
recent commodity boom has two very 
different phases (see Table 2). In 2003, 
although government revenues had already 
increased quite substantially, expenditures 
on public sector salaries and benefits, goods 
and services, and current transfers were 
restrained as part of a package of measures 
(known as the Program for Recovery and 
Development) to effect macroeconomic 
stability. When the Somare Government 
took office in 2002, the ratio of public debt/
GDP was in excess of 60 per cent (Table 
3). In 2003, also as part of the economic 
recovery program, there was the beginning 
of a sustained reduction in the public debt, 
such that by 2007 the public debt/GDP ratio 
had been reduced to 33.8 per cent from 63.1 
per cent in 2003.
However, government management of 
the windfall revenues after 2003 has been a 
‘mixed bag’ as recurrent expenditures have 
also risen very significantly. Between 2002 
and 2007, salaries and benefits increased by 
40 per cent. However, whilst the fiscal burden 
of these personal emoluments peaked in 2004 
at just over 30 per cent of total government 
expenditures they declined thereafter to 22 
per cent of total expenditures by 2007, due 
to the more rapid total expenditure growth.1 
In addition, following a decline in goods 
and services expenditure between 2002 and 
Table 2 Government expenditure in the ‘boom’ years, 1990s and 2000s (kina million)
Years Salaries and 
benefits
Goods and 
services
Current 
transfers
Interest 
payments and 
borrowings
Debt 
repayments
1990s’ boom
1991 384.8 235.8 287.0 114.0 276.8
1992 416.7 255.8 379.8 144.4 121.5
1993 450.5 279.2 498.2 158.3 154.7
1994 543.7 287.0 443.2 148.3 196.6
1995 397.3 275.8 397.3 326.0 224.4
2000s’ boom
2002 1,041.5 878.5 629.8 436.4 764.0
2003 1,100.9 654.7 418.7 739.6 729.4
2004 1,262.4 948.7 597.9 377.0 1,613.2
2005 1,265.8 1,245.1 705.7 332.8 1,673.4
2006 1,360.5 1,084.1 733.3 307.0 1,625.5
2007 1,456.3 1,387.1 .. 370.1 ..
Source: Papua New Guinea, various issues. National Budget Documents, Department of Treasury and Finance, 
Government of Papua New Guinea, Port Moresby.
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2003 (largely arising from the reduction 
in education subsidies), this category of 
expenditure rose by over 110 per cent up to 
2007, whilst up to 2006 current transfers had 
increased by 75 per cent.
It is most likely that it will prove very 
difficult to maintain these levels of recurrent 
expenditure in the face of the large decline in 
commodity revenues expected over the next 
several years. Reducing salaries and benefits 
will be particularly difficult. Over the past 
two years the government has set aside part 
of the windfall revenues in various trust 
funds assigned to expenditure on needed 
investment in areas such as infrastructure, 
education, health, police, and agriculture. 
Will these trust funds be expended on the 
intended investments in the face of pressures 
to maintain the recurrent expenditures?
A closer look at competition 
policy reform in 2008
Readily-taxable, big money-earning sectors 
of the PNG economy, such as mining and 
resource extraction, have had significant 
impacts—both positive and negative—on 
the country’s overall economic performance. 
The development of these resources 
has had some benefits for the country: 
increased output and employment and 
significant windfall revenues for the central 
and provincial governments. However, 
successive governments have so far been 
unable to leverage the exploitation of the 
country’s natural resources into per capita 
income growth and improved service 
delivery.
One cause of the ineffectiveness of 
the large resource revenues to contribute 
Table 3 Domestic and external public debt, 1990s (kina million)
Years
Domestic 
debt
Treasury 
bills
External 
debt
International agency 
borrowings
Public debt/
GDP (per cent)
1990s’ boom
1991 555.9 166.6 1,010.8 .. 43.5
1992 824.4 351.5 1,120.8 .. 46.0
1993 1,036.6 591.8 1,283.3 .. 47.7
1994 1,424.3 1,008.1 1,513.2 .. 53.1
1995 1,605.7 1,217.5 1,718.5 .. 53.7
2000s’ boom
2001 2,115.1 1,748.8 5,294.0 5,178.0 63.0
2002 2,588.3 2,169.1 5,777.0 5,553.4 62.5
2003 3,022.9 2,755.3 4,901.1 4,717.4 63.1
2004 3,181.2 2,236.2 4,409.5 4,239.5 60.0
2005 3,405.4 1,796.5 3,855.8 3,722.7 47.8
2006 3,059.0 1,150.9 3,617.9 3,494.0 39.3
2007 3,168.8 980.1 3,072.7 2,965.1 33.8
Source: Bank of Papua New Guinea, various issues. Quarterly Economic Bulletin, Bank of Papua New Guinea, 
Port Moresby.
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to significant improvements in service 
delivery has been the poor quality control 
and accountability of the royalty revenues 
paid to the mining and petroleum provinces. 
As a result, with the deterioration of public 
sector capacity in the post-independence 
era, these funds have been wasted to a 
large extent (Standish 2007). Another cause 
of the ineffectiveness has been the inability 
of governments to establish a business 
environment that is conducive to the creation 
of diversified economic activity that supports 
widespread wealth creation. This has been 
due to the continuation of poor regulatory 
policies and a business environment that is 
expensive and unfriendly to the development 
of small to medium scale enterprises and to 
competition among them.
Papua New Guinea’s reliance on large-
scale mineral extraction is set to continue 
in 2009 with the potential development 
of the Exxon-Mobile LNG project. The 
LNG project is also likely to impose large 
negative externalities on other sectors. As 
past economic fluctuations have shown, 
however, large enclave mineral projects are 
unlikely to generate the type or quantity 
of employment that is needed to absorb 
Papua New Guinea’s rapidly expanding, 
and increasingly urban, labour force. For 
these reasons, it is now more important than 
ever to invigorate Papua New Guinea’s 
microeconomic reform agenda so that 
widespread wealth creation can occur.
This section considers two aspects 
of Papua New Guinea’s microeconomic 
reform agenda. The first covers recent 
developments in competition policy and the 
effects that these have had during 2008 on 
the air transport and ICT sectors. Emerging 
issues in these sectors are also discussed. 
The second provides an analysis of the 
costs of Papua New Guinea’s regulatory 
environment and the potential benefits of 
making further progress in streamlining 
Papua New Guinea’s business regulations.
Mobile telecommunications
One of the biggest gains made by Papua New 
Guinea during 2008 was the expansion of 
mobile telecommunications arising from the 
entrance of Digicel Pty Ltd as a competitor 
to the incumbent Telikom PNG mobile 
service, B-Mobile. Anecdotally, the introduc-
Table 4 Average call rates for domestic and international phone calls, 2008 (kina  
per minute)
Peak  
(per minute)
Off-Peak  
(per minute)
Domestic
Pre-Digicel K1.80 K1.60
Post-Digicel (September 2008) K0.99 K0.49
International 
Pre-Digicel K2.45 K1.60 
Post-Digicel (September 2008) K1.48 K0.99 
Source: Papua New Guinea, 2008e, Submission to the ICCC Review of the ICT Sector, Department of Treasury 
and Finance, September, Port Moresby (using ICCC and World Bank (2008a) estimates, combined with online 
information from B-mobile and Digicel).
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tion of this competition is widely regarded 
as being one of the most significant improve-
ments to have occurred in the PNG business 
environment.2   Supporting evidence for this 
assessment is the continuing large growth in 
the number of PNG mobile subscribers and 
the market penetration of Digicel.
Prior to the entrance of Digicel in 
July 2007, Independent Consumer and 
Competition Commission (ICCC) and World 
Bank estimates placed the number of mobile 
phone subscribers at between 130,000 and 
140,000. While exact industry figures are not 
available, Telikom and Digicel now claim to 
have over 500,000 customers each, which 
suggests a remarkable 700 per cent growth 
in the number of mobile phone subscribers 
(Papua New Guinea 2008e).
On 26 June 2008, the long-awaited 
interconnection of B-mobile and Digicel 
services was achieved. Previously, they had 
been operating on separate and unconnected 
networks. The interconnection ended 
the rather bizarre situation where many 
consumers carried two mobile phones, one 
for calling through Digicel and the other for 
calling through B-mobile.
Average peak and off-peak domestic call 
billing rates have fallen by 11 per cent for 
peak times and by 51 per cent for off-peak 
times (Table 4). Average peak and off-peak 
international call rates have fallen by 40 
per cent and 38 per cent, respectively, since 
the introduction of Digicel. As well, calling 
rates for both carriers and for both domestic 
and international calls have moved from 
30 second billing increments to per second 
billing increments.
Digicel claims to have invested in 
excess of K450 million in the PNG mobile 
telecommunications market. This investment 
has had a large impact on the coverage and 
quality of domestic services. The quality of 
international connections has also improved, 
with a substantial amount of the investment 
going towards enhancing an international 
gateway. Moreover, there are plans for an 
additional K1 billion investment in the roll-
out of further services over the next three 
years (Stanley 2008:10).
The mobile phone sector growth 
has made a strong contribution to GDP. 
Following the entrance of Digicel in 2007, 
the contribution of the transport, storage 
and communication (TSC) sector to total 
and non-mining GDP has almost doubled—
increasing from 2.7 per cent and 3.0 per cent, 
respectively, in 2006 to 5.1 and 5.7 per cent, 
respectively, in 2008 (see Figure 3). Through 
2008 this sector contributed to just over 20 
per cent of Papua New Guinea’s total GDP 
growth for the year. With total GDP growth 
estimated at 7.16 per cent, this means that 
the TSC sector contributed approximately 
1.4 per cent percentage points to GDP 
growth in 2008.
Challenges for telecommunications 
reform in 2009
Another significant development in the 
mobile telecommunications market during 
2008 was the reinstatement of Telikom 
PNG’s right to monopoly operation of a 
single international gateway, following 
the National Executive Council’s (NEC) 
endorsement of the Revised ICT Policy 
during April (Papua New Guinea 2008b). 
This component of the revised ICT policy 
was justified by the government as being 
necessary to give Telikom PNG the 
opportunity to reform over a transitional 
period. It is claimed that this will help avoid 
the reinstatement of a monopoly provider 
following a complete collapse of Telikom 
PNG, prevent the creation of duplicate 
infrastructure as competitors have an 
incentive to use the Telikom network, as 
well as meet the government’s ‘social and 
security policy’ requirements. In effect it has 
removed Digicel’s ability to operate its own 
gateway connection, lowering its ability to 
charge cheaper rates on international calls. 
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Digicel has disputed Telikom’s exclusive 
rights over the international gateway, and 
the matter is now before the courts (ICCC 
2008a:33)
Most recently, the Department of 
Communications and Information submitted 
an Experts Recommendation Report (Papua 
New Guinea 2009b) as part of the next phase 
of the ICT reform process. The Report’s 
recommendations for the introduction of open 
competition in as timely a manner as possible, 
including the immediate liberalisation of 
international gateway operations and the 
removal of retail price regulation, will be a 
positive step forward for the sector.  However, 
the Report also recommends that PNG 
Telecommunication Authority (PANGTEL) 
should be rejuvenated and transformed so that 
it becomes the single ICT regulator, limiting 
the role of the ICCC to ex post competition 
policy issues. As the Report highlights, it is 
clear that PANGTEL needs reform (Papua 
New Guinea 2009b:364). However, it is 
unclear, and even unlikely, whether even after 
its reform PANGTEL would be as capable as 
the ICCC in undertaking ex ante regulation 
of the sector. The ICCC has been increasingly 
effective at promoting and regulating fair 
and transparent competition within Papua 
New Guinea.
Whether the NEC will adopt any or 
all these recommendations is, as yet, 
Figure 3 Contribution of the transport, storage and communication sector to total and 
non-mining GDP, 2003–2013 (per cent)
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unknown. These upcoming decisions over 
the introduction of open competition, 
combined with the reform of the sector’s 
regulatory structures, will serve as a litmus 
test of the government’s commitment to 
telecommunications reform in 2009.
Air transport
The other major change to Papua New 
Guinea’s national competition policy in 
2008 was the introduction of a code-sharing 
arrangement between an existing airline, 
Airlines PNG, and the Australian-based 
Pacific Blue for flights between Australia and 
Port Moresby (ICCC 2008b). The code-share 
arrangement considerably strengthened the 
competitiveness of Airlines PNG, which, 
because of its small size and limited seat 
capacity, had been a weak competitor for the 
existing code-sharing arrangement between 
Qantas and Air Niugini.
This reform represents further significant 
change in the competitiveness of Papua New 
Guinea’s air transport over recent years. In 
2001, the introduction of Qantas flights 
competing for air travel between Australia 
and Papua New Guinea brought Air Niugini 
to the brink of collapse. Following this, the 
two airlines formed a joint service in 2003, 
effectively limiting price competition on 
flights between the two countries.
The monopoly was weakened somewhat 
following the expansion of Airlines PNG 
from its existing domestic flights to turbo-
prop flights between Port Moresby and 
Cairns in November 2005. This service was 
extended in August 2006 to flights between 
Port Moresby and Brisbane. While it is a 
small carrier, Airlines PNG had a substantial 
impact by absorbing a significant amount 
of excess demand within the sector. Total 
passenger numbers between Australia 
and Papua New Guinea grew by 12 per 
cent in the first 12 months after Airlines 
PNG commenced international services. 
The addition of Airlines PNG’s Brisbane-
Port Moresby service also contributed 
to the 14 per cent growth in passenger 
numbers between Australia and Papua New 
Guinea between June 2006 and June 2007 
(McNamara 2008:7).
To ensure that competition was expanded 
within the sector from the arrangement 
between Airlines PNG and Virgin Pacific, 
the ICCC has maintained the system of ‘hard 
block’ seat allocations, which it implemented 
for the Qantas-Air Niugini partnership. 
Under this arrangement, Airlines PNG pays 
a pre-determined amount to Virgin Pacific 
for a fixed number of seats on each route 
(ICCC 2008b:25). Airlines PNG also assumes 
the cost of any unsold seats within their 
block allocation. This arrangement provides 
an incentive for both airlines to price seats 
competitively.
Figure 4 shows airfares (measured 
in US$ per kilometre travelled) for three 
major routes—Brisbane–Port Moresby, 
Cairns–Port Moresby and Singapore–Port 
Moresby—in January 2008 and January 
2009, the introduction of this additional code 
share has had significant impacts on price 
levels within the sector. In 2008, despite 
Airlines PNG’s considerably lower fares, 
Air Niugini and Qantas chose not to lower 
their fares to comparable levels. This is likely 
to have been because of the limited seat 
capacity, less frequent flight times, and poor 
marketing outlets of Airlines PNG which, 
whilst stimulating its own demand through 
cheaper prices, had a limited impact on the 
passenger numbers of the major carriers. 
However, in 2009, following the 
introduction of the Pacific Blue partnership 
arrangement, all airlines reduced prices for 
these routes to comparable levels. For both 
the Brisbane and Cairns to Port Moresby 
routes, this has meant an almost 65 per cent 
reduction in prices. Another interesting 
point is that on other key non-competing 
routes, such as between Port Moresby and 
Singapore, Air Niugini fares have increased 
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in the 12-month period. This suggests that 
the airline has been cross-subsidising the 
reduced revenues from the Australian 
destinations.3
2009 data from carrier websites and 
authors’ calculations. Lines represent 
the difference between the highest and 
lowest cost economy fares available. Grey 
diamonds represent the median price 
level in 2008. Black diamonds represent 
the median price level in 2009. All airfares 
include taxes. Conversions were carried out 
at the following exchange rates AUD$1 = 
US$0.666 and K1 = US$0.379 spot rate as at 
15 January 2009. All prices were measured 
for travel on 30 January 2009.
Upcoming challenges for aviation sector 
reform
The entry of an additional international 
airline under a partnership arrangement 
has increased the benefits from competition 
in Papua New Guinea’s aviation sector. 
There have been major reductions in fares 
and increased services for international 
travellers. In addition to the direct consumer 
benefits of the fare reductions, reduced air 
travel costs will flow on to other sectors 
such as tourism. However, Australia is only 
one of many key trade, investment, and 
tourism sources for Papua New Guinea and 
consumers still face prohibitively expensive 
airfares to other key destinations in Asia. 
Figure 4 Prices of major international Papua New Guinea air routes, by carrier, January 
2008 and January 2009 (US dollars)
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For example, as of January 2009, flight costs 
to Manila and Tokyo were approximately 
K5,500 and K7,000, respectively. This 
highlights the need to open up all of 
Papua New Guinea’s major air routes to 
international competition, in line with 
the government’s ‘open skies’ policy, so 
that the country can be more competitive 
internationally across a range of sectors.
The continuing commercial success of 
the two partnership arrangements raises 
an important question about the future of 
aviation reform. Their success contradicts 
one of the key justifications for the code-
share arrangements, which argued that 
it was not feasible to have two separate 
airlines operating on these routes. Is the 
government’s policy on code-sharing 
arrangements optimal, or even necessary? 
Reforming these arrangements so that all 
airlines compete individually, across both 
domestic and international markets, may 
help to bolster competition in the sector.
A closer look at PNG business 
regulation
The impact of streamlining business 
regulation on wealth creation4
As history has demonstrated, large enclave 
mining projects do not generate the type 
or quantity of employment that is needed 
to absorb Papua New Guinea’s rapidly 
expanding, and increasingly urban, labour 
force. For this to occur, Papua New Guinea 
requires investment across a range of 
industries. Pervasively high business 
operating costs and an unfriendly regulatory 
regime that impose a large burden on private 
sector activity, particularly small-scale 
enterprises, are frequently cited as some of 
the key development constraints on wealth 
creation in Papua New Guinea (Warner and 
Omuru 2008:13, Chand 2003:23). Indeed, 
despite being the largest market and the 
closest to major international markets, 
Papua New Guinea is seen as having the 
least business friendly environment in 
Melanesia, ranking 95th out of 181 countries 
in the 2009 global ‘ease of doing business’ 
index calculated by the World Bank’s Cost 
of Doing Business (CDB) survey (World Bank 
2009b, see also Figure 5).
Throughout 2008, this situation led to 
frequent calls by donors, academics, the 
private sector, and the general public for 
the introduction of microeconomic reforms 
to reduce business costs and streamline 
bureaucratic processes.  Ultimately, 
the goal of these reforms is to create a 
regulatory environment that encourages 
the widespread establishment of formal 
private sector activity that can unleash the 
competitive market forces witnessed by 
the entrance of firms such as Digicel and 
Virgin Blue.5
This section examines a number of 
potential areas of regulatory reform in 
Papua New Guinea and illustrates how these 
may impact on the country’s international 
competitiveness and its ease of doing 
business ranking. The potential gains from 
implementing the reforms are estimated.
The method used to  make the 
calculations is as follows. First, a regression 
fit scatter plot was calculated to estimate 
the marginal elasticity of income associated 
with improvements in a country’s ranking 
on the CDB Survey. Second, three of the ten 
areas covered by the CDB survey are chosen 
as potential reform areas, on the basis of 
their relevance to Papua New Guinea and 
areas where the country currently lags 
furthest behind. These include Dealing 
with Construction Licences, Trading across 
Borders, and Enforcing Contracts.
Third, a package of possible reform 
outcomes is hypothesised for each of these 
sectors to lower Papua New Guinea’s score 
on the respective indicators to the regional 
average.6 Fourth, the CDB Simulation Dataset 
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is used to calculate the impact each of the 
reforms has on Papua New Guinea’s overall 
ranking on the CDB database. Finally, this 
change in aggregate ranking is compared 
against the calculated marginal income 
elasticity to illustrate the level of income 
achieved by countries with a comparable 
business environment. 
It is important to highlight that these 
calculations are by no means causal in 
their nature. Although the countries in the 
sample provide a reasonably good fit to the 
regression line, the regression has not taken 
into account the myriad of other factors that 
determine income growth. The measures 
are also relative such that any improvement 
or decline in Papua New Guinea’s score 
depends on the performance of all the other 
countries in the sample. In addition, the 
analysis assumes that the links between 
regulatory quality and per capita income 
in other countries are indicative of the links 
between regulatory quality and per capita 
income in Papua New Guinea. As such, 
the calculated income gains from each of 
the three reform packages do not represent 
the immediate or even longer-term gains 
in income that would accrue should Papua 
New Guinea make improvements in each 
one of these indicators. The calculations 
are intended to illustrate the income levels 
achieved by countries that have managed 
to lower their costs of doing business to 
comparable levels to those hypothesised 
Figure 5 Ease of doing business percentile rankings for Pacific island countries
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by these reforms. As discussed, these 
comparisons illustrate several important 
points regarding the potential for, and 
impact of, regulatory reforms in Papua New 
Guinea. 
Estimating the potential impact of 
procedural regulatory reforms
As stated, the three areas chosen for the 
hypothesised reforms were selected on the 
basis of where Papua New Guinea lags 
furthest behind and hence where the biggest 
potential gains can be made from modest 
attempts at reform. Also, the reform targets 
in each scenario have been set to where 
Papua New Guinea achieves the regional 
averages. For this purpose the region is 
defined as Fiji, Tonga, Vanuatu, Samoa, 
Kiribati, Solomon Islands, Marshall Islands, 
Papua New Guinea, and Federated States of 
Micronesia (see Table 5 for the comparison 
of Papua New Guinea’s performance on five 
indicators with the defined Pacific region). 
Unless otherwise stated, these reforms are 
purely procedural changes; meaning that all 
of the gains to business occur as the result 
of shorter time delays or fewer procedures 
for the completion of certain regulatory 
requirements, rather than any reduction in 
the government charges for the regulatory 
approval.
Figure 6 provides a regression fit scatter 
plot of each country’s average percentile rank 
for each of the ten CDB Indicators measured 
against the natural logarithm of the country’s 
GDP per capita. The value obtained from 
this fitted line reflects the average change in 
GDP per capita associated with a marginal 
change in the country’s average percentile 
score on the CDB rankings. Put more simply, 
the slope of the line indicates the average rate 
at which a country’s income increases as its 
performance on the CDB index improves. 
Because GDP per capita is expressed as a 
natural logarithm, this figure is expressed 
as a percentage. Therefore, given a slope 
coefficient of, say, 7.7, an improvement in 
a country’s percentile ranking from, say, 
0.8 to 0.7 is associated with a 77 per cent 
improvement in its GDP per capita.
The assumptions discussed above 
notwithstanding, a number of interesting 
results were found in each of the reform 
scenarios. The results are summarised in 
Tables 6 and 7.
I. Reform Package One: Dealing with 
construction permits
The first reform package is aimed at improving 
the ease with which companies can build 
a standard size warehouse. This reform 
package addresses the procedures, time 
taken, and cost of submitting and obtaining 
all necessary clearances, licences, permits, 
and certificates; as well as completing all 
required notifications and all necessary 
inspections being undertaken. Also included 
are the number of procedures required 
and the time taken to obtain all necessary 
utility connections. At present, Papua New 
Guinea’s Ease of Construction Licence index 
is the worst in the region, ranking 124th in 
the world.
The reform package assumes that Papua 
New Guinea
reduces the number of procedures to •	
obtain all necessary construction licences 
and permits from its current level of 24 to 
the regional average of 14, and
reduces the time taken to complete all •	
required procedures from the current 
level of 217 days to the regional average 
of 102 days.
These reforms would have several 
impacts on Papua New Guinea’s intern-
ational competitiveness. In the first instance, 
they would improve the Ease of Dealing 
with Construction Licences ranking from 
124th to 31st in the world, which would 
place Papua New Guinea in the top 25th 
percentile of countries, compared to its 
18
Pacific Economic BullEtin
Economic survey
Pacific Economic Bulletin Volume 24 number 1 2009 © the australian national university
present rank in the 60th percentile (see 
Table 6). Because of its cheaper fees and 
charges for obtaining these licences (which 
are assumed to stay constant), Papua New 
Guinea’s 25th percentile ranking would be 
below the regional average, which scores 
in the top 30th percentile of countries. This 
effect would flow on to Papua New Guinea’s 
overall Ease of Doing Business index, which 
would improve by 12 places to number 83 
in the world.
These simulated reforms have the 
largest impact of the three proposed reform 
packages on levels of real GDP per capita 
(Table 7). The 0.35 point improvement in 
the average percentile ranking gives Papua 
New Guinea a business environment 
comparable to countries with a per capita 
GDP approximately 3.5 times higher 
than its current level of US$656. These 
comparable countries include Bulgaria 
(US$2,406), Colombia (US$2,461) and 
Romania (US$2,593).
II. Reform Package Two: Reducing the 
costs of trade
The second reform package is aimed at 
reducing the number of procedures required 
Figure 6 Cost of doing business average percentile score vs. log GDP per capita 
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and the time taken to move a shipping 
container of goods through the PNG port 
system. Import procedures begin with 
the vessel’s arrival at the port of entry to 
the shipment’s delivery to the importer’s 
warehouse. For the export of goods, the 
procedures begin with the packing of the 
goods at the factory to their departure from 
the port of exit (World Bank 2008b:21). 
Here again, Papua New Guinea has low 
administrative prices compared to other 
countries in the region. For example, in 2009 
the average administrative costs imposed 
on a shipping container of exports from 
Port Moresby was US$664, compared to 
the regional average of US$944. The cost to 
import was estimated at US$722 per container, 
which again compares favourably with the 
regional average of US$967.8 However, the 
average time taken for export containers to 
move across the wharf is above the regional 
average, at 26 days, as is the time to import 
at 29 days.
The second reform package envisions 
that Papua New Guinea
reduces the number of documents •	
required for exporting from their current 
level of seven to the regional average of 
six, which in turn leads to a reduction in 
the time taken to export from the current 
26 days to the regional average of 24 
days, and 
reduces the number of documents •	
required for importing from their current 
level of nine to the regional average of 
seven, which leads to a reduction in the 
time taken to import from 29 days to the 
regional average of 27 days.
These modest changes in the time and 
effort required to import and export goods 
lead to significant changes in Papua New 
Guinea’s international competitiveness. 
Papua New Guinea presently ranks 89th 
in the Ease of Trading index, placing it in 
the 44th percentile of countries. After the 
reforms, Papua New Guinea would make 
a substantial improvement to rank 57th in 
its Ease of Trading index, placing it in the 
33rd percentile. Overall, this would lead to 
Papua New Guinea’s aggregate CDB ranking 
improving by five places, to 90th in the world 
(Table 6).
These reforms have the smallest impact of 
the three hypothesised packages, increasing 
Papua New Guinea’s average percentile 
ranking by 0.11 (Table 7). Nevertheless, 
they result in Papua New Guinea having 
a business environment comparable to 
countries with a per capita GDP approximately 
double its current income levels. These 
comparable countries include Philippines 
(US$1,216), Georgia (US$1,218) and Vanuatu 
(US$1,275).
III. Reform Package Three: Streamlining 
contract enforcement
The final reform package addresses the 
enforcement of contracts, which attempts to 
measure the efficiency (number of procedures 
required, time taken, and administrative 
costs) of the judicial system in resolving 
commercial disputes. This is Papua New 
Guinea’s worst area of performance across the 
CDB index, ranking 162nd in the world. This 
poor ranking is the result of the high number 
of procedures required to enforce a contract, 
43, and the 591 days, which, on average, is 
required to complete this set of procedures. 
Papua New Guinea’s poor ranking in this area 
also reflects, for the first time, administrative 
costs. The cost of solving commercial disputes 
is estimated to be equivalent to 110 per cent 
of income per capita.
This reform package would not only 
be the most ambitious in terms of reducing 
the procedural requirements and time 
taken to enforce a contract but also involves 
reductions in the cost of achieving these 
outcomes to the regional average.
Therefore, the third reform package 
assumes that Papua New Guinea
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reduces the number of procedures •	
required to enforce a contract from 43 
to the regional average of 36
Reduces the time taken to enforce a •	
contract from Papua New Guinea’s 
current level of 591 days to the regional 
average of 531 days, and
accompanies these two procedural •	
reforms with a reduction in the cost of 
meeting these requirements from 110 
per cent of per capita income to the 
regional average of 52 per cent.
Bringing the cost and effort required to 
enforce a contract down to regional averages 
has a large impact on the ease of enforcing 
contracts, with Papua New Guinea’s 
ranking improving by 50 places to 112th in 
the world. This moves Papua New Guinea 
from the top 77th to the 56th percentile band 
of countries. In turn, this has the effect of 
raising Papua New Guinea’s overall Ease 
of Doing Business index by nine places to 
number 86th in the world (see Table 6).
The impact of these reforms on per 
capita GDP is at the mid-point between 
reform packages I and II. The 0.21 point 
improvement in Papua New Guinea’s 
average percentile ranking across each of its 
indicators improves its business environment 
to be comparable with countries with per 
capita GDP of US$1,712 (see Table 7). Such 
countries include Morocco (US$1,685), 
Serbia (US$1,763), and China (US$1,791).
Lessons from the analysis
Illustrating the changes in Papua New 
Guinea’s international competitiveness 
with these three potentially simple, and 
entirely feasible, reform packages offers 
several important insights into the future 
path of Papua New Guinea’s regulatory 
reform process. The first insight is that 
large gains in Papua New Guinea’s regional 
Table 5 Comparison of financial costs and time delays for key business activities, 2009
Financial cost
Cost of 
starting a 
business 
(per cent of 
income per 
capita)
Cost of 
licences 
(per cent of 
income per 
capita)
Cost to export 
(US$ per 
container)
Cost to 
import (US$ 
per container)
Cost of 
closing a 
business 
(per cent of 
estate)
Papua New Guinea 23.58 95.07 664.00 722.00 23.00
Regional average 47.32 245.44 944.00 967.89 34.13
Time taken
Time to start 
a business 
(days)
Time to 
obtain a 
licence (days)
Time to 
export (days)
Time to 
import (days)
Time to 
close a 
business 
(years)
Papua New Guinea 56.00 217.00 26.00 29.00 3.00
Regional average 34.67 101.89 24.22 27.11 2.60
Source: World Bank, 2009b. Cost of Doing Business Database, World Bank, Washington DC. Available online at 
www.doingbusiness.org (accessed on 20 January 2009) and authors’ calculations.
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competitiveness can be made by relatively 
small reforms that streamline business 
procedures and reduce transaction times. 
Furthermore, whilst other barriers to growth 
remain, lifting the performance of Papua 
New Guinea’s regulatory environment in a 
number of key areas to regional averages—a 
modest goal—could have a large impact on 
income growth. 
Second, costs imposed by government 
on business are not only related to the 
amount of money charged for delivering 
a service. Indeed, as can be seen in Table 
5, Papua New Guinea compares quite 
favourably with other countries in the 
region in terms of fees, licence charges and 
trade duties.
Table 5 also highlights that the reason 
Papua New Guinea ranks so poorly on so 
many indicators is the result of the lengthy 
time delays and the large number of 
bureaucratic procedures involved in these 
business activities. These inefficiencies are 
likely to be a result of a number of factors 
including weak public sector governance 
and the existence of entrenched rent-
seeking behaviour within the bureaucracy. 
Streamlining the number of business 
processes vis-à-vis reducing fees and charges 
should thus stand as a core reform challenge 
for the PNG Government in 2009 as it seeks 
out ways to improve rates of private sector 
growth.
Finally, unlike competition reform, 
each of the reform gains made can be made 
without the creation of losers—beyond 
reducing opportunities for rent seeking 
behaviour by bureaucrats. This ‘win-win’ 
situation, or Pareto welfare improvement, 
means that the government does not have 
to battle vested interest groups as it goes 
about implementing the reforms. This is 
not to diminish the importance of creating 
a more competitive business environment 
but simply to illustrate that streamlining 
of business procedures can generally 
occur without the same political cost as 
competition reform, which has often been 
a binding constraint on economic reform in 
Papua New Guinea.
Ultimately, this discussion highlights 
that streamlining bureaucratic processes, 
reducing the regulatory burden on 
business, and enhancing competition in 
the private sector should not be side issues 
in the government’s development policy. 
Table 6 Impact of simulated reforms on Papua New Guinea’s international 
competitiveness
Reform 
package 
Initial 
overall 
CDB rank
Initial  
CDB rank 
for sector
Initial 
percentile 
for sector
Post-
reform 
overall 
CDB rank
Post-reform 
CDB rank for 
sector
Post-reform 
percentile 
for sector
I 95 124 60 83 31 25
II 95 89 44 90 57 33
III 95 162 77 86 112 56
 Source: Authors’ calculations.
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These issues are in fact at the heart of 
improving Papua New Guinea’s regional 
and international competitiveness. It is only 
through the creation of an environment 
that encourages business growth and 
development across a broad range of sectors 
that Papua New Guinea will be able to create 
the numbers of jobs required to absorb its 
rapidly expanding population.
Recent policy developments in 
intergovernmental fiscal relations
This section discusses the reforms being 
implemented in the system of decentrali-
sation operating in Papua New Guinea. A 
more substantive overview of Papua New 
Guinea’s intergovernmental financing 
history, reforms, and challenges can be 
found in this issue of the Pacific Economic 
Bulletin (Gouy 2009:114-131).
A new system of intergovernmental 
fiscal relations began in January 2009, the 
third distinct system of fiscal decentralisation 
adopted by the Government of PNG. 
The new arrangements are set out in the 
Intergovernmental Relations [Functions 
and Funding] Bill (Papua New Guinea 
2008c) and an amended Organic Law 
on Provincial Governments and Local 
Level Governments (Papua New Guinea 
2008d). The new measures are focussed 
on improving the quality and reach of 
public services, in response to the well-
documented problems experienced with 
the system of fiscal decentralisation in place 
since 1996, especially
large horizontal fiscal imbalances, •	
reflecting the large differences between 
lower-level governments’ resources and 
their expenditure needs
uncertainty and unpredictability of •	
the transfers, as they were fiscally 
unsustainable
weak links between the financing •	
available and the roles and responsibilities 
of the different levels of government
failings on the part of the National •	
Government in implementing and 
Table 7 Impact of simulated reforms on GDP per capita
Reform  
package 
Initial GDP 
per capita
(constant 
2000 US$)
Marginal 
elasticity 
of income 
(with 
respect to 
percentile 
rank)
Impact of 
reform on 
percentile 
rank (change)
Impact of 
reform on 
GDP per 
capita
(per cent 
increase)
Final GDP per 
capita
(constant 2000 
US$)
I
 
656.32
 
7.7 0.35 269 2,421.82
II
 
656.32 7.7 0.11 84 1,212.22
III
 
656.32 7.7 0.21 161 1,712.99
 Source: Authors’ calculations.
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managing the decentralisation program, 
and
the fiscal transfers operating in isolation •	
of each other.
Key elements of the reform
The key intent of the reforms is to reduce 
horizontal fiscal imbalances; that is, to place 
jurisdictions in a similar financial position 
to deliver recurrent services. There are 
separate transfers to pay for all lower-level 
government staff and non-staff, recurrent 
expenditures on national priorities. The 
reforms amend the formulae for distributing 
the non-staff, recurrent grants that lower-
level governments are expected to spend 
delivering national priorities.
From 2009, the grants for individual 
jurisdictions will reflect their recurrent 
expenditure needs: that is, the difference 
between estimates of a jurisdiction’s recurrent 
service delivery costs and their revenue 
raising capacity. The new framework links 
the definition of costs to the jurisdiction’s 
expenditure responsibilities, which thus 
creates a link between funding and function. 
There is provision for functions and funding 
to potentially be reallocated to a different 
level of government. Because there is now 
a process for this, the risk of unilateral 
reassignment of functions to lower-level 
governments without the necessary funding 
is reduced. The mechanism permits an 
asymmetric allocation of responsibilities.
Provincial and local-level governments 
will receive a share of a pool, reflecting their 
proportionate share of total needs. If needs 
are judged to be zero, then the lower-level 
government would potentially receive zero 
in non-staff, recurrent grants.
The PNG National Government has, 
sensibly, increased the size of the non-staff, 
recurrent grants pool in order to fund 
service delivery more effectively and pay 
for a five-year ‘no worse off’ promise made 
to the wealthier jurisdictions. The suite 
of grants remains of a similar magnitude 
in nominal terms as it was in 1996. The 
additional resources are being introduced 
slowly to avoid flooding poorer regions with 
additional money too quickly. This transition 
period runs through to 2013. The reforms 
will try to protect the transfers from fiscal 
adjustments caused by Papua New Guinea’s 
periodic macroeconomic exigencies. To 
do this, the grant pool is specified as a 
precise share of net national government 
revenues: actual total tax revenue two 
years previously, excluding mining and 
petroleum revenue. However, there is 
nothing to stop the National Government 
from breaking its fiscal promises again. 
Lower-level governments will need to see 
several years of promises being kept to 
be assured there will be no repeat of the 
1996–2008 experience.
Potential impacts of the reform
The largest gains from fiscal decentralisation 
reforms will come from prodding lower-
level governments to spend whatever 
resources they have more effectively; not 
doing so has come to be regarded as a central 
failing of the old system. Notwithstanding 
political pronouncements of Governors and 
sub-national politicians, Papua New Guinea 
has the administrative features of a unitary 
system of government, where lower-level 
governments primarily exist to implement a 
set of delegated expenditure responsibilities. 
It is thus appropriate that the centre plays 
an active and vigorous role in ensuring that 
lower-level governments spend resources on 
national priorities. To this end, the reforms 
also embody beefed-up conditionality, 
monitoring, and enforcement arrangements 
by the National Government, focusing on 
the 11 Minimum Priority Activities in health, 
education, infrastructure maintenance, 
agriculture, and local law and justice. The 
challenge for the centre is to follow through 
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and enforce these conditions, as hitherto 
poor jurisdictions begin receiving additional 
resources: otherwise, these extra funds will 
be of no consequence in improving service 
delivery outcomes.
Conclusions
The global commodity boom that led to 
strong growth in the PNG economy in recent 
years came to an end in late 2008 under 
the influence of the global financial crisis. 
Slower economic growth and much higher 
inflation, resulting from poor monetary 
responses to rapid growth in the money 
supply, have put a different face on the 
economic situation in Papua New Guinea 
compared to a year ago.
How will Papua New Guinea cope with 
this economic downturn? The government 
has set aside funds accumulated during the 
commodity boom to be spent on refurbishing 
and developing vital infrastructure and 
human capital. However, it has also increased 
recurrent expenditure significantly during 
the boom. Will the accumulated funds be 
invested in ways that raise productivity 
growth and incomes or will the trust funds 
be used to maintain the level of recurrent 
expenditure committed in recent years? The 
government’s fiscal discipline will be tested 
over the next two years or so.
The government has made significant 
microeconomic reforms in opening up the 
telecommunications and airline markets. 
These reforms are delivering substantial 
benefits to a wide cross-section of the 
population. But further reforms are needed 
to reduce the costs of doing business 
in Papua New Guinea. The scenarios 
explored in this economic survey show 
how some ‘win-win’ reforms to improve 
the investment environment can help to 
deliver increased private investment and 
economic growth.
Finally, the effective delivery of basic 
services to people has proven to be a very 
difficult objective for governments to 
achieve. Attempts to achieve this mainly 
through decentralisation of the activities 
to provincial and local-level governments 
have been largely unsuccessful so far. The 
new set of intergovernmental financing 
reforms being adopted attempt to reduce 
the horizontal fiscal imbalances that 
have plagued earlier attempts at fiscal 
decentralisation. In the process, it is planned 
for the reforms to create a better link 
between funding and function. However, 
in order to achieve the reform goals, the 
national government will have to be more 
active than in the past in ensuring that the 
lower-level governments spend the funds 
effectively on the national priorities.
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Notes
1 One of the most significant increases in 
expenditure in the latter half of the recent 
commodity boom has been the dramatic 
rise in the size of District Support Grants, 
despite few improvements being made to 
their accountability and control mechanisms. 
In 2007 and 2008, government allocated one-
off payments of K10 million to each of the 
countries 89 districts, and an additional K4 
million in 2009.
2 A third service provider, GreenCom 
Pty Ltd, has also been given regulatory 
approval to compete in the PNG mobile 
telecommunications sector but has, as yet, to 
begin operations (Stanley 2008:3). 
3 Although not shown in Figure 4, there is 
similar behaviour on other key Air Niugini 
international routes.
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4 These calculations are easily made and 
there are many possible ways in which this 
analysis could be improved and extended. 
We encourage policymakers, academics, and 
others to draw on the resources provided 
by the World Bank to continue illustrating 
the potentially large economic benefits that 
can accrue from relatively simple reforms to 
streamline business procedures and lower the 
cost of doing business in Papua New Guinea 
and across the Pacific.
5 An increasing number of studies have shown 
that countries with burdensome regulations 
tend to have larger informal sectors, higher 
unemployment rates, slower rates of new 
business formation and, ultimately, slower 
rates of economic growth (World Bank 
2009b:9).
6 The regional average is chosen both to reflect 
a reasonable reform target and to illustrate the 
point that relatively large gains can be made 
in the international competitiveness of Papua 
New Guinea’s business environment with 
relatively small reductions in business costs.
7 The circled data point indicates Papua New 
Guinea, which has an average CDB percentile 
of 0.48 and a log of GDP per capita of 6.48.
8 Costs include the fees levied on a 20-foot 
container, measured in US dollars. All fees 
associated with completing the procedures 
to export or import goods are included, such 
as the cost of documents, administrative 
fees for customs clearance and technical 
control, terminal handling charges, and inland 
transport. The cost measure does not include 
tariffs or other duties.
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